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• Iconic signals ground reference in interlocutors’ experience, thereby supporting language 
development in ontogeny and potentially also in phylogeny. 
• 24- and 36-month-olds, but not 18-month-olds and not great apes, spontaneously identified 
the referent of an iconic signal. 
• Iconic gestures are understood better compared to iconic vocalizations. 
• Not all iconic signals are created equal and their comprehension develops substantially in 
the third year of live. 
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Abstract 
The recognition of iconic correspondence between signal and referent has been argued to 
bootstrap the acquisition and emergence of language. Here we study the ontogeny, and to some 
extent the phylogeny, of the ability to spontaneously relate iconic signals, gestures and/or 
vocalizations, to previous experience. Children at 18, 24, and 36 months of age (N = 216) and great 
apes (N = 13) interacted with two apparatuses, each comprising a distinct action and sound. 
Subsequently, an experimenter mimicked either the action, the sound, or both in combination to 
refer to one of the apparatuses. Experiment 1 and 2 found no spontaneous comprehension in great 
apes and 18-month-old children. At 24 months of age, children were successful with a composite 
vocalization-gesture signal but not with either vocalization or gesture alone. At 36 months, children 
succeeded both with a composite vocalization-gesture signal and with gesture alone, but not with 
vocalization alone. In general, gestures were understood better compared to vocalizations. 
Experiment 4 showed that gestures were understood irrespective of how children learned about the 
corresponding action (through observation or self-experience). This pattern of results demonstrates 
that iconic signals can be a powerful way to establish reference in the absence of language, but 
they are not trivial for children to comprehend and not all iconic signals are created equal. 
Keywords: Iconicity, Gesture, Onomatopoeia, Sound-symbolism, Language development, 
Evolution 
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Introduction 
Language refers to things through the use of conventional signs or symbols. But perhaps 
more basic are “naturally referential” signals, that is, signals that denote their referent not by 
convention but by being somehow naturally connected to it, either as indices (e.g., pointing) or as 
icons (Peirce, 1932). In contrast to symbols, iconic signals resemble their referents, and thereby 
directly relate to interlocutors’ experience. They can be created and understood on the spot to 
communicate a wide variety of meanings in the absence of pre-established conventions. This has 
led scholars to assume a substantial contribution of iconic signals to the development of language, 
both in ontogeny and phylogeny (Brentari & Goldin-Meadow, 2017; Cartmill, Beilock, & Goldin-
Meadow, 2012; Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2015; Donald, 1991; Fay, 
Ellison, & Garrod, 2014; Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014; Sterelny, 2017; Tomasello, 2008; Werner & 
Kaplan, 1963). From a psychological perspective, iconic signals work because they relate to some 
form of shared experience between interlocutors around the signaler’s intended referent. 
The role of iconic properties of signals for comprehension and learning has been studied in 
two domains, visual and auditory. Work on visual gesture comprehension with young children has 
mostly focused on whether children are better at learning gestures with iconic properties compared 
to arbitrary gestures as labels for objects. Children accept gestures as labels for objects at around 
18 months (Namy, 2001; Namy & Waxman, 1998). Given communicative training, children 
identify iconic gestures as labels for familiar objects at 18 months (Tomasello, Striano, & Rochat, 
1999). When learning labels for novel objects, reliable comprehension of iconic gestures emerges 
around 26 months of age (Namy, 2008). However, there seems to be no advantage for iconic over 
arbitrary gestures early in development (Namy, Campbell, & Tomasello, 2004). Children appear 
to accept any kind of label if it is explicitly taught. Nevertheless, iconic, but not arbitrary gestures 
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can potentially be created and understood on the spot, enabling successful communication in the 
absence of explicit prior instruction. For example, from 30 months onwards, children use iconic 
gestures as input to learn novel verbs (Goodrich & Hudson Kam, 2009; see also Mumford & Kita, 
2014). In these studies, the gesture grounded the meaning of the word in prior experience by 
representing an action that happened earlier. In the studies presented here, we investigate the early 
development (starting at 18 months) of spontaneous comprehension of flexibly created, novel 
iconic gestures. Furthermore, we directly contrast iconic gestures with iconic vocalizations. 
Iconicity in vocal signals has been studied in form of sound symbolism and onomatopoeia. 
The equivalent to visual iconic gestures in vocal signals are onomatopoeia, words or vocalizations 
that mimic some property of their referent. A classic example would be saying “woof woof” to 
refer to a dog. Recent work found that onomatopoetic words are more frequent across languages 
than previously thought (Monaghan, Shillcock, Christiansen, & Kirby, 2014) and are acquired 
earlier in development (Perry, Perlman, & Lupyan, 2015; Perry, Perlman, Winter, Massaro, & 
Lupyan, 2017). However, onomatopoetic properties co-vary with other variables known to support 
word learning, for example mean pitch, word duration and repetition (Laing, Vihman, & Keren-
Portnoy, 2017). Furthermore, the advantage of onomatopoetic over conventional words in infants’ 
ability to match words to their referents is mediated by infants’ familiarity with the form (Laing, 
2017). Thus, whether or not onomatopoetic words are acquired earlier because children 
spontaneously recognize the iconic correspondence between word and referent is somewhat 
unclear. 
Studies on sound symbolism exploit the idea of cross-modal iconic correspondence between 
visual and auditory stimuli. For example, a round shape (a circle) bears resemblance to a vowel 
rich word (“bouba”). A number of studies report evidence for cross-modal matching already in 
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very young infants (e.g. Asano et al., 2015; Ozturk, Krehm, & Vouloumanos, 2013). Furthermore, 
sound-symbolic properties have been shown to facilitate word learning in older children (e.g. Imai, 
Kita, Nagumo, & Okada, 2008; Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006; Nygaard, Cook, & Namy, 
2009). As a consequence, Imai and Kita (2014) suggested that the ability to recognize cross-modal 
matching is biologically endowed, allowing sound-symbolism to bootstrap language acquisition. 
A recent meta-analysis (Fort et al., 2018) paints a slightly less enthusiastic picture, finding early 
cross-modal matching only for round shape-sound pairings and increasing effect sizes with age. 
Furthermore, sound-symbolism has been studied in terms of online cross-modal matching, relating 
shapes to sounds in the here and now. Part of the importance of iconic signals lies in the fact that 
they allow flexible communication about absent or transient aspects of experience. 
Investigating the evolutionary origins of the ability to match iconic signals to aspects of 
previous experience complements developmental lines of research. Studying humans’ closest 
living relatives, the great apes, allows us to make inferences about the last common ancestor and 
thereby approximates whether the cognitive processes enabling the ability in question likely 
emerged before or after the lineages leading to humans and the other great apes separated. 
Reconstructing the evolutionary history of iconic signal comprehension is particularly relevant 
because a number of theoretical accounts on language evolution suggest some sort of intermediate 
iconic proto-language, vocal or signed (see e.g. Donald, 1991; Fitch, 2010; Tomasello, 2008; 
Zlatev, Persson, & Gärdenfors, 2005). Finding that great apes understand iconic gestures and 
vocalizations would make it plausible that communication based on iconic signals might have 
scaffolded the emergence of the cognitive architecture underlying human communication and 
language.    
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Research on iconicity in great ape communication is fairly sparse compared to research with 
children. With respect to visual gesture, larger observational studies do not find evidence for a 
widespread use of such iconic gestures in great apes in the wild or in captivity (Call & Tomasello, 
2007; Genty, Breuer, Hobaiter, & Byrne, 2009; Graham, Furuichi, & Byrne, 2017; Hobaiter & 
Byrne, 2011). However, there are occasional reports of great apes using seemingly iconic gestures 
(Douglas & Moscovice, 2015; Genty & Zuberbühler, 2014; Russon & Andrews, 2010). Based on 
observations alone, whether the iconicity in these gestures lies in the eye of the (human) beholder 
or plays a role in them being used and understood, remains unclear. The only experimental study 
so far found no evidence for spontaneous comprehension in chimpanzees (Bohn, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2016). In this study, participants first learned how to retrieve a reward from two 
apparatuses together with an experimenter. Later the experimenter used a gesture mimicking the 
action performed at one of the apparatuses to inform the participant that this would be the one 
yielding a reward next. Results showed no signs of spontaneous (within first 24 trials) gesture 
comprehension in chimpanzees. However, the same study found that iconic gestures are learned 
faster compared to arbitrary gestures, suggesting some recognition of the iconicity involved. To 
our knowledge, there have been no reports or experimental studies on iconic vocalizations in any 
of the great apes. 
Here we follow up on the results found by Bohn et al. (2016), extending the type of signals 
studied to vocalizations as well as gestures. More specifically, we seek to integrate previous work 
into a unified design that can allow us to directly study and compare different types of iconic 
signals. Our current study focused on spontaneous comprehension, that is, whether participants 
were able to identify a referent by relating a novel iconic signal to aspects of a previously shared 
episode. The setup varied slightly between groups but had the same overall structure. Participants 
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interacted with an experimenter around two apparatuses, each involving a distinct action and 
producing a distinct sound upon operation. These properties were not highlighted during the initial 
interaction. Later on, the experimenter referred to one of the apparatuses by mimicking its action, 
its sound or both. Participants responded by approaching one of the apparatuses. In all groups, we 
first looked at combined signals, comprising gesture and vocalization, and, in case of 
comprehension, we studied gesture and vocalization separately. That is, we assumed an additive 
effect of the iconic information provided in gesture and vocalization. In experiment 1, we studied 
great apes. Experiments 2 and 3 traced the development of the ability in question in children 
between 18 and 36 months of age. Experiment 4 focused on two alternative ways in which gestures 
can be understood. 
Experiment 1 
A previous study found no spontaneous comprehension of iconic gestures by chimpanzees 
(Bohn et al., 2016). In experiment 1, we extended this earlier work in four ways. First, we 
introduced a communicative training in which participants learned to use a hand gesture (pointing) 
from a human to decide between two alternatives. This training was designed to ensure that 
participants understand the structure of the task at hand and know that the experimenter provides 
them with useful information. Second, we enriched the iconic signal by adding a vocalization. 
Participants could rely on the similarity between gesture and action performed at the apparatus as 
well as between a vocalization and the sound emitted by the apparatus. Third, we modified the 
setup in line with suggestions to improve apes’ performance in object choice tasks more generally 
(Mulcahy & Hedge, 2012). Finally, we tested two more great ape species (bonobos and orangutans) 
in addition to chimpanzees, thereby diversifying the sample. 
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Methods 
Thirteen great apes (mean = 22.00 years, range = 7.00 – 42.00) 
participated in the study, including five bonobos (Pan paniscus, four females), four chimpanzees 
(Pan troglodytes, three females) and four orangutans (Pongo abelii, three females). One of the 
chimpanzees had participated in a previous study (Bohn et al., 2016). Two additional chimpanzees 
were initially part of the sample but had to be excluded because they lost interest in the study or 
were unable to operate the apparatuses. All apes were housed at the Wolfgang Köhler Primate 
Research Center at Zoo Leipzig, Germany. The sample size for apes was determined by the number 
of apes that were available for testing. Research was noninvasive and strictly adhered to the legal 
requirements of Germany. Animal husbandry and research complied with the European 
Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA) Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care 
of Animals in Zoos and Aquaria and the World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA) 
Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquarium. Participation 
was voluntary, all food was given in addition to the daily diet, and water was available ad libitum 
throughout the study. Data was collected between November 2015 and June 2016. 
The left panel in Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the setup. Apes were 
tested in a subsection of their familiar sleeping rooms comprising two adjacent cages with a small 
booth between them. The walls of the booth either consisted of large windows or transparent 
panels. The door between the cages remained open throughout a session. Plexiglas panels (69 x 48 
cm) with an opening at the bottom (8.5 x 2.5 cm) were installed left and right to the booth. The test 
apparatuses were attached to these windows. The distance between apparatuses was 130 cm. In the 
beginning of a trial, the experimenter stood between the apparatuses, ~ 150 cm away from the 
participant. Apparatuses were the same as in Bohn et al. (2016). Each consisted of a rectangular 
Participants 
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box (50 x 25 x 17.5 cm) and two releasing mechanisms attached to the top. A reward was released 
to the participant through a corresponding hole in the bottom of the box when participant and 
experimenter operated the mechanism simultaneously. Retrieving the reward alone was not 
possible. The actions required to operate the mechanisms were: pulling down a rope, pushing in a 
lever, turning a crank, and moving a lever from right to left. These actions were turned into gestures 
by performing the same bodily movements detached from the apparatus. Each box also contained 
a speaker and a MP3-player. Contingent on operating the releasing mechanism, the speaker played 
a distinct sound (either a high-pitched bell or two alternating low-pitched notes), otherwise they 
remained silent. During the test, the experimenter imitated these sounds vocally. Drawings of the 
releasing mechanisms and sound files can be found in the supplementary material. A juice 
dispenser was used to release small amounts of diluted grape juice to the participant when located 
in the middle of the booth. Thereby the experimenter could center the participant in the beginning 
of a trial. All trials were videotaped using a wide-angle camera installed above the experimenter, 
providing a full view of the setup. Participants were tested individually and received banana pellets 
as rewards. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the setup in experiment 1 (left), experiment 2 (middle) and 
experiment 3 and 4 (right). In each drawing, the position of the apparatuses, participant and the 
experimenter(s) corresponds to the configuration at test. 
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For each participant we randomly assigned a releasing 
mechanism and a sound to the left and the right box. The only constraint was that the chimpanzee 
who participated in the Bohn et al. (2016) study received different releasing mechanisms compared 
to that earlier study. We created matched pairs by age and species and assigned members of a pair 
randomly to one of two groups. One group (seven individuals) started directly with the training 
phase and received the test phase afterwards. The other group (six individuals) first received the 
test, then the training and then again, the test. Starting with the test right away in one group allowed 
us to re-assess spontaneous comprehension without training as in Bohn et al. (2016). The training 
had two phases (details below). 
Training and test sessions each comprised 12 trials. The order in which apparatuses were 
indicated from trial to trial was randomly determined with the constraints that both sides were 
indicated equally often, and the same side was never indicated more than two times in a row. 
Participants received two sessions (24 trials) in test and a maximum of 16 sessions in each training 
phase. The learning criterion for each training phase was 18/24 trials correct within two sessions. 
Participants who did not reach the training criterion during the second training phase nevertheless 
received the test. As described above, apes started with the combined condition. The general 
procedure was the same for training and test. The experimenter initiated the trial by centering the 
participant in the middle of the booth using the juice dispenser. Then the experimenter attracted 
the participant’s attention by calling her name and started signaling. While signaling, the 
experimenter faced the participant, trying to make eye contact. The signal varied depending on 
condition. In the first training phase, the experimenter pointed with the index finger by moving his 
arm contralateral across his chest while also turning the head and looking at the apparatus. In the 
second phase, pointing remained the same while head-turning and gazing were omitted. In the test 
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phase, the experimenter mimicked the action and the sound of the corresponding apparatus. 
Gestures and vocalizations were produced simultaneously in blocks of four repetitions and 
continued until the participant approached one of the apparatuses. If the participant started moving 
before the first signal was emitted, the experimenter centered her again. Regardless of condition, 
if the choice was correct, the experimenter followed suit and together they operated the apparatus, 
dispensing a reward to the participant. If the choice was incorrect, the experimenter approached 
the correct apparatus during training (no reward was dispensed) but followed the participant during 
the test. That is, reinforcement was differential in training and non-differential during test. 
We coded correct choice, that is, whether or not the participant 
approached the apparatus indicated by the experimenter’s signal (gesture and vocalization). For 
apes and all subsequent studies with children, we used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) 
with binomial error structure to analyze the data. All models included a maximal random effect 
structure with random intercepts for participant and random slopes for trial. To assess whether the 
inclusion of predictors improved model fit relative to a null model, we used likelihood ratio tests 
(Dobson & Barnett, 2008). Performance within a given group was compared against chance (50% 
correct) by fitting a GLMM with centered predictors and testing whether the intercept differed from 
zero. This approach allowed us to account for unequal numbers of trials for participants (more 
relevant for children than for apes). All models were fitted in R (R Core Team, 2017) using the 
function glmer of the R-package lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Code and data 
for all models can be found in the supplementary material. The model for apes included predictors 
for group (start with test or training), training (reached criterion in second training phase) and trial. 
Given the small number of individuals, we did not analyse species separately. On an individual 
level, performance in test was considered above chance if 18 or more trials (out of 24) were correct 
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(binomial test, p < .05). A second coder, blind to the purpose of the experiment coded 25% of 
randomly selected test trials. Agreement between coders was 100%. 
Results 
Looking at spontaneous comprehension in the group that started with the test, we found that 
performance did not significantly differ from chance on an individual or group level (mean 
proportion correct = 0.47, ! = -0.11, p = .505, 95% CI = [-0.44 : 0.20]). Next, we looked at the 
effect of communicative training. All but one chimpanzee reached learning criterion in the first 
training phase. Six apes (4 bonobos, 1 chimpanzee, 1 orangutan) also reached criterion in the 
second training phase. Apes who succeeded in both training phases needed an average of 143.83 
trials in total (range: 48 – 204) to do so. Figure 2 two shows performance for all participants in the 
test phase following training. Again, neither on the group (mean correct: 0.50, ! = 0, p = 1, 95% 
CI = [-0.24 : 0.24]) nor on an individual level did performance differ from chance. Group and 
training success had no influence on performance ("#(3) = 0.43, p = .930), suggesting that training 
success did not improve performance. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 replicates the findings from Bohn et al. (2016) in a largely independent 
sample. None of the measures (training, enriched signal, setup, diverse sample) introduced to 
improve apes’ performance turned out to be fruitful. All except one participant showed a general 
understanding of the task by passing one or both training stages. Nevertheless, switching from one 
hand gesture to another (enriched by vocalization) led to a breakdown in performance by all 
participants. Together with Bohn et al. (2016), 23 different apes have now been tested with none 
of them showing signs for spontaneous comprehension of iconic signals. However, all these apes 
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were housed in a zoo setting. It is unclear if apes with different housing/rearing conditions would 
perform differently. Another caveat of these studies is that the gesturer was always a human instead 
of a conspecific. Future studies should definitely try to alleviate these shortcomings. However, apes 
have been shown to be able to comprehend iconic gestures performed by a human after a longer 
learning period (Bohn et al., 2016; see also Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2013) and 
do not generally perform better when tested with a conspecific model (Boesch, 2007). Taken 
together, this research suggests that great apes have difficulties with spontaneously inferring the 
referent of a novel, representational communicative act. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of correct choices by participants for experiment 1 - 4. The dashed line 
indicates performance expected by chance. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (see also 
Table 1). Differently sized circles represent the number of participants with a certain level of 
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Experiment 2 
In the following experiments, we explored the developmental origins of the ability to 
spontaneously comprehend iconic signals based on shared experience in human children. 
Whenever reasonable, we also contrasted the modalities in which the signal was presented. In 
experiment 2, we tested 18-month-olds. This is the youngest age at which children have been 
shown to comprehend iconic gestures (Tomasello et al., 1999). While the general structure of the 
experiment was the same in all the remaining experiments with children, there were some 
differences in setup and procedure for 18-month-olds compared to 24- and 36-month-olds. The 
data for 18-month-olds was collected first and, after finding negative results in the combined 
condition, the procedure was refined to make the choice situation and overall structure more 
plausible for older children. This prevents a direct comparison between age groups and so we 
present and analyse the data as part of a separate experiment. 
Methods 
The sample sizes for the following experiments with children were 
based on a simulation study assuming a medium, additive effect of gesture and vocalization and a 
small effect of age with no interaction between age and condition. We simulated 1000 datasets with 
different sample sizes, different levels of within sample variation and different numbers of trials 
per participant. Power was assessed by running a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) for 
each simulation and aggregating over the model outputs. For more details and access to the 
corresponding code, please contact the first author. Based on these simulations, sufficient power to 
detect the assumed effects would be achieved with a sample size of 24 children per cell. In 
experiment 2, we therefore tested 24 children (12 boys) with a mean age of 18.39 months (range = 
17.82 – 18.97). Five additional children started participating but were excluded because they 
Participants 
NATURAL REFERENCE 15 
became uncomfortable with the testing situation (3), their parents interfered (1) or one apparatus 
broke (1). Children lived in an ethnically homogeneous, mid-sized German city with approx. 
550.000 inhabitants and median household income of €1767 per month in 2017 (Stadt Leipzig, 
2018). Participants were mostly mono-lingual and had mixed socio-economic background. They 
were recruited from a database of children whose parents volunteered to take part in studies on 
child development. Data were collected between October and December 2015. 
The middle panel of Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the setup. 
Children were tested in a large, rectangular room within a child laboratory. The two apparatuses 
were located at the short wall on the far end of the room 180 cm apart from one another. A small 
table stood in the middle of the room, 370 cm away from the apparatuses. One apparatus consisted 
of a cuboid wooden box (52 x 25 x 30 cm) with a Plexiglas tube (height 53 cm, diameter 5 cm) and 
a lever (height 22 cm) sticking out on top. Inside the tube was a red ping pong ball. Pushing down 
the lever pushed the ball upwards, making it jump when pushed with sufficient force. When 
pushing down, the lever also hit a bell located inside the box, producing a single ring. The 
experimenter always pushed down the lever with her right hand, palm facing down. The gesture 
derived from this apparatus involved the same movement without the object. The vocalization 
involved vocally imitating the ring of the bell. The second apparatus was composed of a lower 
wooden box (38 x 33 x 37 cm) with a vertical stick on top. Mounted on top of this stick was a 
second wooden box (50 x 37 x 11 cm). Like a seesaw, the upper box could be tilted left and right. 
It had a Plexiglas window on top, granting view to 21 colored balls inside it. Tilting the apparatus 
made the balls roll from one side to the other. A bone shaped squeaky toy was attached to the 
bottom of the box. When tilting the box left or right the toy produced a squeaking sound. A vertical 
handle was attached to the long side of the box to facilitate tilting it back and forth. The gesture 
Setup 
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corresponding to this apparatus was pretending to hold the handle with both hands and tilting the 
box from left to right. The vocalization was a vocal imitation of the squeaking sound. In between 
trials, the experimenter used a stacking rings toy to center the child at the table. All trials were 
videotaped. 
Children received a single session comprising four trials with 
each apparatus being indicated twice. Across participants, we counterbalanced the order in which 
the apparatuses were indicated, the location they were positioned in (left or right) and which 
apparatus was introduced first. Like all other groups, 18-month-olds also started with the combined 
condition. Children arrived in the child laboratory in a play room where they met the experimenter. 
After a short period of free play, the experimenter, child and parent entered the test room. Parents 
were asked to take a seat in a corner and to stay passive throughout the experiment. The 
experimenter first introduced the child to the stacking ring toys at the central table. After playing 
there for a while, the experimenter introduced the child to the first apparatus. The experimenter 
first demonstrated to the child how the apparatus functioned by playing with it and then encouraged 
the child to play herself. After playing with the first apparatus, child and experimenter shortly 
returned to the central table for a round of stacking rings and then approached the second apparatus. 
The introduction to each apparatus lasted approximately 20 seconds with each child performing 
the action at least three times. Importantly, the experimenter never commented on the way the 
apparatus moved or sounded and never used iconic gestures to instruct the child. Following the 
second introduction, child and experimenter again returned to the table. The experimenter knelt 
down with his back towards the apparatuses and encouraged the child to go to the opposite end of 
the table. After another round of stacking rings, the first test trial started. The experimenter removed 
the toys from the table, caught the child’s attention and said: “Let’s play with the [iconic signal] 
Design and Procedure 
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again” (German: “Lass uns nochmal mit dem [iconic signal] spielen”). Within the utterance, the 
iconic signal was repeated four times. If the child did not point to or approach one of the 
apparatuses, this utterance was repeated. Some children answered with an equivalent of “Ok” but 
did not approach or indicate one of the apparatuses. In those cases, the experimenter said, “Let’s 
go, you first” (German: “Los geht’s, Du zuerst”). If the child did not approach or indicate one of 
the apparatuses within 2 min, the experimenter turned around and approached the indicated and 
encouraged the child to follow. Whenever the child approached or otherwise indicated an 
apparatus, the experimenter approached it (non-differential reinforcement). Experimenter and child 
briefly played with the indicated apparatus, then played with the other apparatus and finally 
returned to the table where the next trial began. Because they did not perform above chance in the 
combined condition, 18-month-olds were not tested in the gesture or vocalization condition. 
We coded whether or not the child pointed to or approached 
the apparatus indicated by the experimenter’s signal. Only trials in which the participant made a 
choice were considered for the analysis. Reliability coding of 25% of randomly selected trials 
yielded an agreement of 100% between coders. The model for 18-month-olds had the same general 
random effect structure (see above) and no additional predictors. 
Results 
Table 1 shows detailed results of the model as well as performance in the first trial. Children 
in this experiment did not choose the correct apparatus above chance (see also Figure 2). 
Discussion 
In contrast to Tomasello et al. (1999), we found no spontaneous comprehension of iconic 
signals. In this earlier study, children were given a communicative training before the test and were 
Coding and Analysis 
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tested on gestures for familiar objects (e.g. a hammer). The latter makes the iconic interpretation 
of the gestures somehow questionable as children might have learned the corresponding gestures 
as conventional ones. It is, however, unclear whether a communicative training, like the one 
provided for apes, would boost 18-month-olds’ performance. 
Table 1 
Performance compared to chance within groups for experiments 2 - 4 
Age group Condition ! CI 2.5% CI 97.5% p T1 † T1: p‡ 
18mo combined 0.19 -0.37 0.86 .49 15 .31 
24mo combined 0.56 0.07 1.31 .04 17 .06 
 gesture 0.16 -0.37 0.80 .50 13 .84 
 sound -0.05 -0.59 0.45 .82 16 .15 
36mo combined 0.69 0.27 1.33 < .01 17 .06 
 gesture 1.16 0.75 2.29 < .01 20 < .01 
 sound 0.10 -0.39 0.60 .65 12 1.00 
 experience 0.92 0.45 1.70 < .01 21 < .01 
 observation 0.89 0.42 1.71 < .01 20 < .01 
Note. All estimates based on GLMMs with the following structure: correct ~ 1 + (trial | id). 
Estimates different from 0 indicate performance different from chance (50% correct). CI 2.5% / 
97.5% = Lower and upper bound of 95% confidence intervals.  
†T1 = Number of children choosing correct (out of 24) in trial 1.  
‡T1: p = P-values for trial 1 based on two-tailed binomial tests. 
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Experiment 3 
In experiment 3, we followed the developmental pathway of the ability in question by 
studying slightly older children: 24- and 36-month-olds. The procedure was slightly different as 
well. The reasons for the adjustments were the following: We wanted to get closer to the idea of 
making spontaneous reference to an earlier shared episode by introducing a longer delay between 
exposure and test. Furthermore, to make the choice situation clearer, we asked children a question 
instead of prompting them to approach one of the apparatuses. 
Methods 
For each combination of condition and age group we tested 24 children. 
In total, 144 children participated in this study, 72 two-year-olds (36 boys, mean age 24.02 months 
(range = 23.50 – 24.52) and 72 three-year-olds (36 boys, mean age 35.68 months (range = 32.91 – 
39.25). In addition, 20 two-year-olds and four three-year olds started with the study but had to be 
excluded because they were uncomfortable with the test situation (20), parents interfered (2) or one 
of the apparatuses malfunctioned (2). Children lived in the same city described above. Two-year-
olds were again recruited from a database, while three-year olds were recruited from local 
kindergartens. Data for two-year-olds was collected between July 2016 and March 2017, and for 
three-year-olds between March and May 2017. 
The right panel of Figure 1 shows a schematic overview of the setup in the test 
situation. Two-year-olds were tested in a room within a child laboratory and three-year-olds in a 
separate room in their kindergarten. For two-year-olds, parents were present in the room but were 
asked to remain passive. The apparatuses were the same as in experiment 2. Two wooden occluders 
(85 x 85 cm) were placed 145 cm apart from one another. In the exposure phase, the apparatuses 
Participants 
Setup 
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were placed next to one another, in between the two occluders. During the test phase, they were 
put behind them. A pillow was placed in the back of the room, 110 cm away from the apparatuses, 
marking the child’s position during test (L2). From this position, the child had full view of the 
apparatuses, even when placed behind the occluder. A second pillow was placed in the front of the 
room, 180 cm away from the apparatuses, marking the experimenter’s position during test (L1). 
From this position, the experimenter could not see the apparatuses when placed behind the 
occluders. The iconic signals were the same as in experiment 2. 
Number of trials and counterbalancing was identical to 
experiment 2. Children entered the room together with two experimenters (E1 and E2). The 
apparatuses were initially placed next to the occluders. After a short play period at L1, E1 
introduced the child to the two apparatuses in the same way as in experiment 2. After the 
introduction, E1 pretended to have forgotten something outside and left the room. Next, E2 took 
out a ball and asked the child if she wanted to play. In order to make room for playing with the 
ball, E2 moved the apparatuses out of the space between the occluders behind them. Then E2 and 
the child tossed the ball back and forth. After 90s, E1 knocked on the door, announcing his return. 
Thereupon, E2 led the child to L2, and called E1 in. E1 entered the room, positioned himself at L1, 
looked puzzled from left to right and asked the child, “Uhm…[child’s name], where is the [iconic 
signal]?” (German: “Ähm…[child’s name], wo ist denn das [iconic signal]?”). Repetitions of this 
utterance and the choice phase were the same as in experiment 2. If the child did not respond within 
two minutes, E2 pointed out the correct apparatus. Whenever the child indicated one of the 
apparatuses, E1 moved forward and looked behind the occluder. In case it was the one 
corresponding to the signal, he cheered, moved it from behind the occluder and encouraged the 
child to play with him. In case it was the wrong apparatus, he looked over to the other side and 
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said, “Oh no, this is the one I was looking for”, again followed by moving the apparatus and a play 
period. That is, in contrast to experiment 2, children were differentially reinforced. After also 
moving and playing with the second apparatus, E1 again left the room and the next trial began. 
After the second trial, E2 switched the position of the two apparatuses. The reason for doing so 
was to keep E1’s asking and searching plausible. Two- and three-year-olds performed above 
chance in the combined condition and were therefore also tested in the gesture and vocalization 
only condition. 
Coding was identical to experiment 2. Agreement between 
reliability coders (25% of trials) was 100% for two- and three-year-olds. First, we compared 
performance in each condition and age group combination to chance using models akin to the one 
used in experiment 2. Next, we compared performance across conditions and age groups in a model 
comprising age group, condition and their interaction as fixed effects. 
Results 
Table 1 shows detailed results for the models comparing performance against chance as 
well as first trial performance (see also Figure 2). Two-year-olds performed above chance in the 
combined condition while three-year-olds did so in the combined and in the gesture condition. In 
each of these cases, overall performance was also reflected in the first trial (all p near or below 
.05). When comparing performance across age groups and conditions, we found that including 
these predictors improved model fit ("#(5) = 18.88, p < .001). There was no significant interaction 
between age and condition ("#(2) = 4.29, p = .120). We had no hypothesis about such an interaction 
(see power simulation) and therefore removed it to evaluate the main effects. We found a main 
effect of condition ("#(2) = 9.80, p = .010) and age ("#(1) = 5.05, p = .020). Children performed 
better in the combined and the gesture condition compared to the vocalization condition 
Coding and Analysis 
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(vocalization as reference level - combined: ! = 0.60, p = .008, 95% CI = [0.16 : 1.15]; gesture: ! 
= 0.63, p = .006, 95% CI = [0.23 : 1.15]). Furthermore, three-year-olds outperformed two-year-
olds (! = 0.42, 95% CI = [0.08 : 0.82]). 
Discussion 
We found evidence for spontaneous comprehension of iconic signals at 24 months. Around 
the same age, children also start to produce iconic gestures (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014). 
Overall, 36-month-olds performed better compared to the younger age group. Furthermore, 
children performed better in the combined and the gesture condition compared to the vocalization 
condition. At odds with the spontaneous comprehension interpretation of the 
onomatopoetic/sound-symbolic advantage in early word learning (Imai & Kita, 2014), we did not 
find spontaneous comprehension of vocalizations alone in the two age groups. Vocalization might 
have enriched the gesture for 24-month-olds as they performed above chance in the combined but 
not in the gesture condition. The developmental pattern found here also mirrors children’s 
understanding of representations in gestures and pictures or scale models more generally 
(DeLoache, 1987, 2000; Novack, Goldin-Meadow, & Woodward, 2015; Tolar, Lederberg, 
Gokhale, & Tomasello, 2007). For example, when pictures are used to inform the child of the 
location of a hidden toy, 30- but not 24-month-olds were able to retrieve it (DeLoache, & Burns, 
1994). Interestingly, and reminiscent of our finding for combined signals in 24-month-olds, the 
more iconic (i.e. more realistic) pictures are, the earlier children are able to transfer labels from 
pictures to real objects (Ganea, Allen, Butler, Carey, & DeLoache, 2009). 
Why was gesture easier? On a closer look, gestures could be understood in two non-
exclusive ways. On the one hand, the gesture visually resembled the action performed by the 
experimenter at the apparatus. Seeing the gesture therefore activates an episodic memory trace of 
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the play episode at the indicated apparatus and singled it out as the intended referent. On the other 
hand, seeing the gesture activates the child’s motor representation of the action she performed at 
this apparatus (mediated by the mirror neuron system, see e.g. Andric et al., 2013; Cook, Bird, 
Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Montgomery, Isenberg, & Haxby, 2007; Villarreal et al., 2008), 
with similar consequences. Vocalization on the other hand only shares a perceptual similarity with 
the earlier episode but does not resonate in motor experience. To test the idea that gesture is easier 
because it relates to multiple aspects of experience, we conducted a fourth experiment. 
Experiment 4 
In experiment 4, we followed up on the idea that gestures are easier understood because 
they provide more referential information. We isolated the two ways in which gestures could be 
understood by changing the way that children learned about the apparatuses. In one group, children 
only saw the experimenter act on the apparatus (observation), in the other condition, children never 
saw anybody act on the apparatus but only did so themselves (experience). The following 
predictions can be made: If gesture in experiment 3 contained more referential information, 
performance in both conditions should resemble the vocalization condition of experiment 3. This 
is because each condition, like vocalizations, only relates to one aspect of the previous experience. 
If gesture is primarily understood because it resonates in motor experience, performance should be 
better in the experience condition while performance in the observation condition should be at 
chance. If gesture in general constitutes something like a privileged modality compared to 
vocalization, the two conditions in experiment 4 should differ from the vocalization but not the 
gesture condition in experiment 3. 
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Methods 
A total of 48 three-year-olds (24 boys, mean age 36.29 months, range 
= 32.77 – 38.92) participated in the study. Children were again recruited from local kindergartens. 
Thirteen additional children started participating but had to be excluded because they were 
uncomfortable with the test situation (10), experimenter error (2) or apparatus malfunctioning (1). 
Data was collected between September and November 2017. 
The same setup as in experiment 3 was used. 
Design and procedure were identical to the gesture condition 
of experiment 3, except for changes during the exposure phase. In the observation condition, only 
E1 played with the apparatuses while the child remained in L1 with E2. Children were encouraged 
to watch E1 play but the actions performed by E1 were never labelled. In the experience condition, 
only the child played with the apparatuses. Es encouraged the child to discover the functionality of 
the apparatuses on her own, occasionally directing her attention to the relevant parts. Importantly, 
neither E performed or labelled the actions required to play with the apparatus. During test, only 
gestures were used as iconic signals. 
Coding was identical to experiment 1, 2 and 3. Reliability 
coding of 25% of trials yielded and agreement of 95.74% ($ = 0.91). In addition to models 
comparing performance to chance, we ran a model comparing the gesture and vocalization 
conditions of experiment 3 to the two conditions of experiment 4 (vocalization as reference level) 
and a model comparing only gesture conditions. 
Participants 
Setup 
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Results 
Children selected the correct apparatus above chance in both gesture conditions (see Table 
1 and Figure 2). Performance in all gesture conditions was better compared to the vocalization 
condition (main effect of condition: "#(3) = 12.22, p = .007; gesture: ! = 1.07, p = .001, 95% CI 
= [0.47 : 1.86]; observation: ! = 0.75, p = .017, 95% CI = [0.16 : 1.46]; experience: ! = 0.79, p = 
.013, 95% CI = [0.16 : 1.48]). There was no effect of condition in a model excluding the 
vocalization condition ("#(2) = 1.04, p = .600), suggesting that removing one sort referential 
information from gestures does not impair comprehension. 
Discussion 
Children understood iconic gestures in this experiment regardless of how they were 
introduced to the corresponding action. This finding suggests that iconic information presented in 
the gestural modality seems to be more accessible to children early in development compared to 
vocalization. There are, however, some limitations to this interpretation, which we will discuss 
below. 
General Discussion 
We investigated the phylo- and ontogenetic origins of spontaneous comprehension of iconic 
gestures and vocalizations. We found no signs for such comprehension in great apes and the 
youngest human age group, 18-month-olds. At 24 months of age, children showed some 
comprehension of iconic signals mimicking both the action and the sound associated with an 
apparatus. Thirty-six-month-olds showed an overall higher performance and robust comprehension 
of combined signals as well as gestures, but not vocalization. Overall, gestures were more readily 
understood compared to sounds, suggesting that information presented in this modality is more 
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readily available to children early in development. A follow-up experiment showed that this was 
not due to gesture relating to multiple aspects of experience. Taken together, this research suggests 
that while recognizing iconic correspondence between signal and referent may boost 
communicative development from two years onwards, it is unlikely to contribute to the early 
emergence of referential communication.  
Previous work with apes suggested that they have problems with spontaneously inferring 
the referent of a novel iconic gesture (Bohn et al., 2016). Here we find similar results, despite the 
fact that we trained participants to use a different informative hand gesture provided by the same 
human experimenter beforehand and also enriched the signal and the setup in various ways 
compared to the earlier study. As mentioned in the discussion of study 1, there are several 
limitations to our approach that should be addressed in future research. Importantly, however, the 
work by Bohn et al. (2016) also showed that great apes learn (over a longer period of time) iconic 
gestures faster compared to arbitrary gestures, suggesting that the iconicity of the gestures used 
here is accessible to apes in principle. Our results therefore suggest that great apes, at least the ones 
tested in these studies, have problems with spontaneously comprehending iconic signals. 
Iconicity in the signal can contribute to children’s language learning in three ways. First, 
children can directly identify the intended referent of the word by recognizing the similarity 
between the iconic signal and the corresponding aspect of their previous experience. Second, 
overlap in perceptual features makes referents more salient when referred to by a signal comprising 
iconic properties, creating more opportunities for direct word to meaning mapping. Finally, iconic 
properties can systematically co-vary with other signal properties that facilitate learning. Here we 
were primarily interested in the first type. Our results show that children spontaneously recognize 
correspondence at around 24 months of age if the signal comprises both vocalization and gesture. 
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At 36 months of age, this ability becomes more robust, with solid recognition of combined signals 
and gestures. In all cases, performance in the first trial mirrored the overall performance, suggesting 
that children indeed spontaneously recognized the iconic correspondence. While vocalizations 
contributed to comprehension when combined with gestures, at least for 24-month-olds, we did not 
find any evidence that vocalization alone allowed children to spontaneously identify the referent. 
Together with the findings by Laing et al. (2017) and Fort et al. (2018), our results therefore 
question the interpretation that sound-symbolic or onomatopoetic words offer children with “a 
nascent representation of the word meaning without effort” (Imai & Kita, 2014). 
The difference between gesture and vocalization conditions further suggests that children 
differentiate between different forms of iconicity. Experiment 4 showed that gesture 
comprehension was immune to the way that children learned about the action (through observation 
or experience), suggesting that the difference between conditions is not due to gestures being more 
informative because they relate to multiple aspects of experience simultaneously. This pattern 
resonates with other research, finding that action-based gestures, like the ones we used here, are 
especially suited to establish reference in the absence of language (Cartmill, Rissman, Novack, & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2017; Fay, Lister, Ellison, & Goldin-Meadow, 2014; Ortega, Sümer, & Özyürek, 
2017). Ortega et al. (2017) proposed that the advantage of action-based gestures stems from their 
direct connection to motor experience. Our results from experiment 4 show that motor and visual 
experience are interchangeable as the basis for gesture comprehension, suggesting that gesture 
relates to action representations in a more general way. Vocalization, on the other hand, does not 
directly relate to one’s own or others’ action and might therefore lack an easily accessible 
representational basis. 
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There are a number of limitations to the studies presented here that need to be addressed in 
the future. First, it will be important to show that the difference between gesture and vocalization 
comprehension holds for a wider variety of gestures and vocalizations. Furthermore, even though 
both aspects mimicked parts of the same experience, gestures were derived from intentional human 
actions whereas vocalizations mimicked a by-product of these actions. Children might encode and 
therefore remember these two aspects differently. In future studies, it would be interesting to see if 
the difference between vocalization and gesture persist if the intended outcome of the action is a 
sound, for example when playing a musical instrument. Gesture and vocalization also differ in the 
number of overlapping features compared to their source. Iconic gestures involve the same bodily 
movements (by the same person) as the corresponding action. Vocalizations might be considered 
to be further removed because they are produced by a different entity than the corresponding sound. 
This is, however, an inherent feature of this mode of communication. Equalizing this difference 
(e.g. by using a playback instead of a vocalization) would have resulted in a rather unusual type of 
signal and we therefore refrained from doing so. Finally, cross cultural work will be necessary to 
evaluate whether the developmental transition in representational abilities between two and three 
is something that is characteristic of western societies or more universal. Recent comparative work 
within western societies finds differences in iconic gesture production in this age range (Marentette, 
Pettenati, Bello, & Volterra, 2016), suggesting that comprehension might also vary across cultures.  
To summarize, our findings indicate that iconic signals can be a powerful way to 
spontaneously ground reference in experience, thereby providing rich information about a signal’s 
meaning in context. Their comprehension, however, is not trivial and develops substantially in the 
third year of life. Finally, not all iconic signals seem to be created equal. 
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